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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
In the case of Trust Company of Georgia v. J. T. Rose, collector, the district
court of the United States for the northern district of Georgia held that a
member of a syndicate receiving stock in a new corporation organized by the
syndicate to take over an existing corporation is not taxable on the difference
between the cost of the new stock to the member and the price at which stock
of the same class and character was sold to the public.
This case arose out of the reorganization of the Coca Cola Company of
Georgia. The new company, a Delaware corporation, acquired all the assets
of the old company for 10,000 shares of preferred stock of the new company at
$100 per share and $15,000,000 in cash. The new company obtained the cash
by thesaleof 83,000shares to the Bankers Syndicate at $5 per share and 417,000
shares to a selling syndicate at $35 per share. The member of the syndicate
(Trust Company of Georgia, plaintiff in this action) retained out of the 83,000
shares 13,677 shares for which it paid $5 per share but under the syndicate
agreement this stock was tied up in a voting trust for five years. The selling
syndicate sold the stock it took to the public at $40 per share. Apparently the
treasury sought to tax the trust company in the year in which this transaction
occurred, 1919, on the difference between the subscription price of $5 and the
selling price of $40. The district court held that no taxable profit arose until
the trust company sold the stock. The principal interest in the decision lies in
the court’s conclusions of law from which the following is quoted:
"The constitution permits unapportioned taxation of incomes derived
from any source. Yet the thing made taxable is not mere increment of
value, but either some new property acquired or increment so detached and
severed from a former investment as to accrue to the separate benefit and
enjoyment of the taxpayer. To be income, it must ‘come in’; to be de
rived, it must be separated, taken ‘from the stream,’ as the two com
pounded Latin words signify. The compensation of labor or services is
such new property acquired. Interest, rent, profits on sales, dividends on
corporate stocks are instances of severed increment on former investments.
All the things mentioned are sought to be taxed in section 213 of the
revenue act of 1918. The question here is, was there any form of taxable
gain realized by the trust company in 1919 in its acquirement of these
13,677 shares of common stock of the new company at $5 per share? Any
gain in the transaction can not be considered as in whole or in part ‘com
pensation for personal services.’ What is meant by these words is plainly
services to another for which the taxpayer is paid by that other. No one
here hired the trust company to do anything. It was the prime mover in
all that was done. Its president, Mr. Woodruff, was compensated by the
bankers’ syndicate for his services by making over to him certain shares of
stock; but the trust company paid for all it got just what the others, in
cluding its own stockholders, paid for what they severally got. Trading,
investment, rather than services, were the source of the gain.”
There is a fine distinction here. No one, we think, will question that the
profit derived by the trust company, which was a member of the Selling Syndi
cate as well as of the Bankers' Syndicate, consisted of, first, the actual cash profit
resulting from its participation in the Selling Syndicate and, second, its profit
as a member of the Bankers’ Syndicate. According to the facts in the case it
accounted for its profit of $5 per share on its participation as a member of the
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Selling Syndicate, presumably in 1919, but the court apparently held that its
profit as a member of the Bankers’ Syndicate was not in the nature of compen
sation for services rendered in the reorganization, but in the nature of profit on
an investment, a conclusion rather difficult for the layman to reach. On the
other hand, the layman will not quarrel with the decision when consideration is
given to the fact that the stock in question was tied up for five years in a pool
and for that reason had no real market value until the termination of the pool
ing agreement.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Held, that 25% of the 1922 profits from a business taxed to the husband,
never passed nor was intended to pass to him and that the board of tax appeals
erred in holding that for the purpose of federal taxation, the husband should be
considered the owner of all the assets of a business under an agreement between
a husband and wife, both residents of Massachusetts, neither clearly defined
nor carried into legal results even to the extent covered by their loose under
standing, to transfer 75% of a business owned by the wife to the husband, such
agreement being a nullity under Massachusetts law. (U. S. circuit court of ap
peals, first circuit, Ashton Hamilton v. Commissioner of internal revenue.)
Rents from mining properties received in accordance with the terms of a
testamentary trust by which the rents due an estate under an agreement en
tered into prior to March 1, 1913, demising to another all the coal in place in
consideration of monthly rents, were to be paid to designated beneficiaries,
consist of a return of capital representing coal in place and taxable income and
are not proceeds from the sale of assets by the grantor. (U. S. circuit court of
appeals, third circuit, Kate W. Rosenberger v. Blakely D. McCaughn, collector.)
Interest is collectable, under sec. 250 (b), act of 1921, upon a tax shown to be
due upon an amended return, paid voluntarily and without assessment before
examination and audit of the taxpayer’s return by the commissioner. (U. S.
circuit court of appeals, second circuit, Union Pacific Railroad Company v.
Frank K. Bowers.)
A domestic corporation is subject to the tax imposed by the act of 1918 upon
income derived from the purchase of articles within the United States and the
exportation of such articles to countries foreign to the United States, such tax
not being unconstitutional (1) as discriminatory because Porto Rico and Philip
pine Island corporations doing a similar business are not subject to the tax
under the same act, nor (2) as a burden upon its export business. (U. S. dis
trict court, S. D. New York, Neuss Hesslein & Co., Inc., v. William H. Edwards,
collector.)
Action upon claims of the United States for 1918 taxes was postponed until a
waiver and evidence of an assessment claimed to have been made were pro
duced.
The government has six years for collection of 1919 taxes, assessed March 5,
1925, within the period of the statute of limitations on assessments.
Refund of taxes paid upon a consolidated return for 1920 upon the com
missioner’s determination that each subsidiary should have made its own
return should be allocated to the subsidiaries in the proportions respectively in
which they contributed to the tax, and should not be applied against the liabil
ity of one of the subsidiaries which had the least assets and against which the
government had asserted the largest claim. (U. S. district court, E. D.
Kentucky, The West Virginia Rail Company v. Jewett Bigelow & Brooks Coal
Company, et al.)
Income derived in 1918 and 1919 from a business conducted as an individual
prior to incorporation in 1919 upon which a taxpayer elected to be taxed as
corporate income under sec. 330, act of 1918, may not be included in determin
ing the 15 per cent. limitation upon deductions for charitable contributions.
(U. S. district court, S. D. New York, Reuben Sadowsky v. Charles W. Anderson,
collector.)
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